Multiple Vulnerabilities in Kiddoware Kids Place Parental Control Android App


Multiple Vulnerabilities


Kiddoware Kids Place Parental Control Android App

Vulnerable Version


Fixed Version

3.8.50 or higher

CVE Number

CVE-2023-28153, CVE-2023-29078, CVE-2023-29079






Fabian Densborn (Office Vienna), Bernhard Gründling (Office Vienna) | SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in the Kiddoware Kids Place Parental Control Android App. Users of the parent's web dashboard can be attacked via cross site scripting or cross site request forgery vulnerabilities, or attackers may upload arbitrary files to the children's devices. Furthermore, children are able to bypass any restrictions without the parents noticing.

Vendor description

"Kiddoware is the world’s leading parental control solutions company with a wide range of products and  serving over 5 million families worldwide. Kiddoware is committed in helping you to protect your kids while providing you intelligence to be proactive about your childs’ online activities."


Business recommendation

The vendor provides an update for the affected version(s) which should be installed immediately.

An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is highly advised, to identify and resolve potential further critical security issues.

The issues identified in this application were part of our blog post "The hidden costs of parental control apps" published a few months ago:


Vulnerability overview/description

1) Login and registration returns password as MD5 hash

Login and registration requests return the unsalted MD5 hash of the password. This indicates that the passwords are stored in an insecure format at the server. Furthermore, MD5 hashing should not be used anymore in modern applications.

2) Stored XSS via device name in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29079)

The customizable name of the child's device can be used to trigger a XSS payload in the parent web dashboard. Children might be able to attack their parents' account.

3) Possible CSRF attacks in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29078)

All requests in the web dashboard are vulnerable to CSRF attacks. The requests contain the device Id of the child device which must be known to the attacker in order to successfully attack a child. But the device Id is not considered a secret, as it is used in the URL in some requests. An attacker could have obtained the Id through the browser history.

4) Arbitrary File Upload to AWS S3 bucket

The web dashboard lets parents send files to the child's device. The selected file is uploaded to an AWS S3 bucket and the returned URL will be transmitted to the device which will then download it. It is possible to send arbitrary files to the child's device and thereby upload arbitrary files (size restriction ~10MB) to the AWS S3 bucket. The returned link is publicly available, so it is possible to use the server to spread malware.

5) Disable Child App Restriction without Parent's notice (CVE-2023-28153)

The child can remove all restrictions temporarily without the parents noticing.

Proof of concept

1) Login and registration returns password as MD5 hash

The "Change password" request looks as follows:

POST /account/change_password/ HTTP/1.1
Cookie: [...]


The response from the web server contains the hashed, unsalted password:

			"message":"Password successfully changed!"

Proving this is an unsalted MD5 hash:

$ echo -n "password" | md5sum -t
5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99  -

2) Stored XSS via device name in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29079) 

The device name can be changed by the child's account by sending a POST request to the API with the pushDeviceConfig method. The following payload can be used as a PoC to trigger an alert box on every page the device name is visible in the parent dashboard. Children/attackers would be able to take over their parents' accounts via this attack.

POST /v2/api/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 461
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/3.12.8
Connection: close

        "deviceName":"\"><img src=x onerror=\"alert(1)\"/>",

3) Possible CSRF attacks in parent Dashboard (CVE-2023-29078)

As an example, an attacker can abuse the CSRF vulnerability to download an arbitrary file to a child's device. It is simply needed to create a form which automatically submits on page load. If a parent is logged in the web dashboard and visits  this malicious site, the authenticated request will be sent and the file specified in the URL parameter will be downloaded by the child's device.

POST /account/push_content/ HTTP/1.1
Cookie: [...]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: https://
Content-Length: 75
Connection: close  

4) Arbitrary File Upload to AWS S3 bucket

The web dashboard lets parents upload arbitrary files to the Kiddoware AWS S3 bucket and push it to the child device.

POST /account/push_content_file/ HTTP/1.1
Cookie: [...]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------27687116714103572458683268551
Origin: https://
Content-Length: 296

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="push_file"; filename=""
Content-Type: text/plain


The upload of the eicar file worked without errors and could subsequently also be downloaded  via the returned link. So there is no antivirus scan on the uploaded files.

5) Disable Child App Restriction without Parent's notice (CVE-2023-28153)

The child can disable the restrictions of the application without the parents noticing.
For this, the following steps are necessary:
a) If Android settings are blocked, reboot into Android Safe Mode.
b) Disable "Display over other apps" Permission for the app in Android settings.
c) After rebooting into normal mode, the child device can be used without restrictions. 

For example, previously locked apps can now be used. To notice the problem, the parent has to check the parent's dashboard manually, a notification is not sent. If the child turns the permission back on in the meantime, the bypass will go unnoticed.

Vulnerable / tested versions

The following version has been tested and downloaded through Google Play store, which was the most recent version available at the time of the test:

  • 3.8.45

Later on, version 3.8.49 (2022-10-25) has been verified to be vulnerable as well.

Vendor contact timeline

2022-11-23 Contacting vendor through and Asking for security contact.
2022-11-23 Response received, requesting advisory to be submitted to an employee mail. No encryption demanded. Advisory sent to vendor.
2022-11-28 Vendor informs about ongoing backend rewrites and removing some upload functionalities. Some fixes will be live by Q1 2023. Everything will be addressed by end of 01-04-2023.
2022-12-15 SEC Consult informs about upcoming blog post about parental control apps
2022-12-15 Vendor states that most of the issues have already been fixed.
2022-12-16 Recheck of vulnerabilities shows that not all vulnerabilities have been sufficiently addressed. Vendor was informed.
2022-12-16 Vendor explains what security measures will be implemented and informs SEC Consult as soon as this is done.
2022-12-30 Vendor informs that fixes for the found vulnerabilities have been published.
2023-01-11 SEC Consult rechecks the vulnerabilities and found out that the applied patches are not sufficient. Again, informs the vendor about it.
2023-02-14 No response from vendor, reminder sent.
2023-02-14 Vendor informs SEC Consult that all issues have been resolved.
2023-03-10 Requesting CVE numbers.
2023-03-12 Assigned CVE number for "Disable child restriction" finding.
2023-03-31 Assigned CVE numbers for XSS and CSRF findings.
2023-05-15 Public release of security advisory.


The vendor provides a patched version which should be installed immediately through Google Play store.

  • Version: 3.8.50 or higher


No workaround available.  


Advisory URL


EOF Fabian Densborn, Bernhard Gründling


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