Multiple Vulnerabilities in Quanos Content Solutions SCHEMA ST4

Title

Multiple Vulnerabilities

Product

Quanos Content Solutions SCHEMA ST4

Vulnerable Version

All versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises; cloud/SaaS unaffected

Fixed Version

Not applicable, see workaround section for mitigation.

CVE Number

CVE-2026-11857, CVE-2026-11858

Impact

high

Found

19.12.2025

By

J. Kruchem (Office Vienna) | SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

Management summary

All on-premise versions of SCHEMA ST4 are affected by a local privilege escalation vulnerability that can also result in arbitrary file overwrite. The vulnerabilities originate from the Update Service’s .NET Remoting interface: one weakness stems from its insecure-by-design deserialization behavior when processing input from local callers, while the other arises from insufficient access control and authentication on the exposed named-pipe endpoint. Both allow low-privileged local users to execute code or perform file operations with SYSTEM privileges. The vendor provides a workaround to disable the affected update service. The cloud/SaaS solution is not affected by the vulnerabilities according to the vendor.

Vendor description

"SCHEMA ST4 is a component content management system for the professional creation of technical documentation. SCHEMA ST4 is one of the most widely used software solutions of its type and makes the entire creation process easier and more efficient, saving costs in many areas."

Source: https://quanos.com/en/products/schema-st4/

Business recommendation

The vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires their customers to disable the affected "Client Update Service". Updating the client is then only possible manually with a privileged user account.

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues.

Vulnerability overview/description

1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)

A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in SCHEMA ST4 due to insecure deserialization in the .NET Remoting service.

The service is configured with TypeFilterLevel.Full and bound to local interfaces only (named pipes), allowing a local authenticated attacker to send specially crafted objects. This leads to arbitrary code execution in the context of the update process with the highest SYSTEM rights. Local host access with an authenticated user session is required for successful exploitation. Network-only exploitation is not possible.

2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)

The SCHEMA ST4 Update Service acts as a privileged helper component running as NT Authority\SYSTEM to perform file operations requiring elevated rights. However, it exposes a .NET Remoting interface over a Named Pipe without sufficient access controls or authentication. This allows any local low-privileged user to connect and invoke methods like Update(), resulting in arbitrary file write/delete operations with SYSTEM privileges. This ultimately leads to local privilege escalation.

Proof of concept

The following steps can be taken in order to exploit the identified security issue in the updater service.

1) .NET Remoting Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11857)

1.1) Connect to Name Pipe

Invoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe("ST4Updater2") and sending pipe.Write("init") returns a port which is used for .NET Remoting. Only local exploitation is possible.

1.2) Send .NET Remoting payload

Use the ExploitRemotingService by James Forshaw (https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService) to achieve arbitrary code execution.

2) Arbitrary File Overwrite Vulnerability (CVE-2026-11858)

2.1) Connect to Named Pipe

Invoking NamedPipe.ConnectToPipe("ST4Updater2") and sending pipe.Write("init") returns a port which is used for .NET Remoting.

2.2) Get .NET Remoting Object

Get remote object tcp:// 127.0.0.1:<port>/UpdateProcessCore

2.3) Create Manifest

An essential part of the exploit is creating a Manifest.rdf containing e.g. Directory "." and file exploit.exe:<something like md5> (is not checked). The Manifest needs to be zlib-compressed and be served via HTTP.

2.4) Create Payload

Create a zlib-compressed file (e.g. .exe, .msi, .dll, ...) name it to your choosing like <e.g. md5> and put it into the HTTP root (like 
the Manifest).

2.5) Invoke Update() from remote .NET object

Use the object from 2.2) and provide proper arguments. Use "Newer" for writing files as system (same name will be deleted beforehands)
Use "Remove" for deleting files and/or directories (depending on Manifest)

Example:

[ Proof of Concept example removed ]

2.6) Privilege Escalation

To achieve privilege escalation e.g. write a custom HID.dll using the exploit to C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\ then open the Microsoft on-screen keyboard in a security context (e.g. CTRL + ALT + ENTF). The custom commands are executed with SYSTEM privileges.

Figure 1: Proof of concept

Vulnerable / tested versions

The following version has been tested:

  • 12.0.4.0 ST4 2022 SP4 (1d4a0bde) ??? SCHEMA ST4 12.4 build 2023.02.21-1d4a0bde

According to the vendor, all versions of SCHEMA ST4 on-premises are affected. The Cloud/SaaS deployments of SCHEMA ST4 are not affected. The Client Update Service has been removed in the cloud architecture according to the vendor.

Vendor contact timeline

2025-12-19 Contacting vendor through info@quanos.com; no response
2026-01-13 Contacting CISO through LinkedIn. Response after 1 Minute (at 7 pm).
2026-01-14 Sending more details via email to security@quanos.com; Vendor answers that they will analyze our information and will get back to us. Asking the vendor how we should submit our security advisory.
2026-01-22 Vendor responds that the architecture of ST4 is by design and only exploitable within the on premises version of ST4 (not cloud/SaaS). Provides a workaround to disable the client update service.
2026-01-23 Updating our advisory regarding workaround, recommending to patch the issue, as also .NET remoting can be exploited. Asking whether the on premises version is EOL.
2026-01-28 Vendor responds to clarify our questions internally.
2026-02-09 Asking for a status update.
2026-02-10 Vendor is still waiting for an internal response.
2026-03-05 Asking for a status update.
2026-03-10 Vendor is still in internal clarification process.
2026-03-20 Vendor provides detailed explanation regarding "Client Update "Service", which already got removed in the Cloud/SaaS solution, on-premises exploitation is impossible in properly managed environments according to the vendor. As a workaround, the Update Service should be disabled. The .NET Remoting part only communicates in a closed VPC network within the Cloud solution. An attacker already needs LAN access for the on-premises version and exploitation is therefore limited according to the vendor. Vendor suggests to include their assessment of the case in our advisory.
2026-03-20 Response to the vendor that the attack path for the "Client Update Service" is to escalate privileges from a low-privileged user to admin. In order to exploit .NET Remoting, host access is also required. Asking for affected versions and whether no update will be provided except the workaround.
2026-04-08 Vendor responds with affected versions and details on workaround implications for end users
2026-06-10 Informing vendor about upcoming release for 16th June, providing reserved CVE numbers.
2026-06-12 Vendor responds that they will provide feedback on 15th June.
2026-06-15 Asking the vendor regarding the feedback, as we did not receive it (late afternoon). Vendor responds that they are still working on the feedback. Vendor submits feedback in the evening.
2026-06-16 Responding to feedback, adjusted advisory.
2026-06-17 Public release of security advisory.

Solution

The vendor does not provide a patch but a workaround which requires their customers to disable the "Client Update Service". Updating the client
is then only possible with a privileged user account. 

The vendor provided the following statement:
"Quanos confirms that exploitation requires local host access with an authenticated user session. In properly managed environments following the
Least Privilege principle, the attack surface is significantly reduced. Quanos Cloud/SaaS deployments are not affected. Quanos considers the migration to the Cloud/SaaS architecture the strategic long-term solution."

Workaround

Disable the "Client-Updateservice" until a fix is provided.

Advisory URL

https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/

 

EOF J. Kruchem / @2026

 

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