Authenticated command injection in multiple Ubiquiti Networks products

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20170316-0 >


title: Authenticated Command Injection

product: Multiple Ubiquiti Networks products, e.g.


AG-HP-2G20, AG-HP-5G23, AG-HP-5G27, AirGrid M,

AirGrid M2, AirGrid M5, AR, AR-HP, BM2HP, BM2-Ti,

BM5HP, BM5-Ti, LiteStation M5, locoM2, locoM5,

locoM9, M2, M3, M365, M5, M900, NB-2G18, NB-5G22,

NB-5G25, NBM3, NBM365, NBM9, NSM2, NSM3, NSM365,


Power AP N

vulnerable version: v1.3.3 (SW), v5.6.9/v6.0 (XM)

fixed version: Update 2017-03-21: AirOS v8.0.1, AirOS v6.0.1,

AirGateway v1.1.8, TOUGHSwitch v1.3.4

CVE number: -

impact: Critical


found: 2016-11-22

by: T. Weber (Office Vienna)

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab


An integrated part of SEC Consult

Bangkok - Berlin - Linz - Luxembourg - Montreal - Moscow

Kuala Lumpur - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich




Vendor description:


"Ubiquiti Networks develops high-performance networking

technology for service providers and enterprises. Our technology

platforms focus on delivering highly advanced and easily deployable

solutions that appeal to a global customer base in underserved and

underpenetrated markets."





Business recommendation:


SEC Consult recommends not to use this product in a production environment

until a thorough security review has been performed by security

professionals and all identified issues have been resolved.



Vulnerability overview/description:


1) Command Injection in Admin Interface

A command injection vulnerability was found in "pingtest_action.cgi".

This script is vulnerable since it is possible to inject a value of a

variable. One of the reasons for this behaviour is the used PHP version

(PHP/FI 2.0.1 from 1997).


The vulnerability can be exploited by luring an attacked user to click

on a crafted link or just surf on a malicious website. The whole attack

can be performed via a single GET-request and is very simple since there

is no CSRF protection. See our other advisory published in January 2017:


An attacker can open a port binding or reverse shell to connect to the

device and is also able to change the "passwd" since the web service

runs with root privileges!


Furthermore, low privileged read-only users, which can be created in the web

interface, are also able to perform this attack.


If the Ubiquiti device acts as router or even as firewall, the attacker

can take over the whole network by exploiting this vulnerability.



Proof of concept:


1) Command Injection in Admin Interface

The following link can be used to open a reverse shell to the attacker's

IP address. There are two possibilities for the different firmware


Reverse root shell - firmware: v1.3.3 (SW)

[ PoC removed - no patch available ]


Reverse root shell - firmware: v5.6.9/v6.0 (XM)

[ PoC removed - no patch available ]


A video is available here:


Vulnerable / tested versions:


The following devices and firmware versions have been tested/verified:

TS-8-PRO - v1.3.3 (SW)

(Rocket) M5 - v5.6.9/v6.0 (XM)

(PicoStationM2HP) PICOM2HP - v5.6.9/v6.0 (XM)

(NanoStationM5) NSM5 - v5.6.9/v6.0 (XM)


Based on information embedded in the firmware of other Ubiquiti products

gathered from our IoT Inspector tool we believe the following devices are

affected as well:


Ubiquiti Networks AF24 (Version: AF24 v3.2)

Ubiquiti Networks AF24HD (Version: AF24 v3.2)

Ubiquiti Networks AF-2X (Version: AF2X v3.2 )

Ubiquiti Networks AF-3X (Version: AF3X v3.2)

Ubiquiti Networks AF5 (Version: AF5 v3.2)

Ubiquiti Networks AF5U (Version: AF5 v3.2)

Ubiquiti Networks AF-5X (Version: AF5X v3.2.1)

Ubiquiti Networks AG-PRO-INS (Version: AirGWP v1.1.7)

Ubiquiti Networks airGateway (Version: AirGW v1.1.7)

Ubiquiti Networks airGateway-LR (Version: AirGW v1.1.7)

Ubiquiti Networks AMG-PRO (Version: AirGWP v1.1.7)

Ubiquiti Networks LBE-5AC-16-120 (Version: WA v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks LBE-5AC-23 (Version: WA v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks LBE-M5-23 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks NBE-5AC-16 (Version: WA v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks NBE-5AC-19 (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks NBE-M2-13 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks NBE-M5-16 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks NBE-M5-19 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-300 (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-300-ISO (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-400 (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-400-ISO (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-500 (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-500-ISO (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-5AC-620 (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M2-400 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M5-300 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M5-300-ISO (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M5-400 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M5-400-ISO (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks PBE-M5-620 (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks R5AC-Lite (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks R5AC-PRISM (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks R5AC-PTMP (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks R5AC-PTP (Version: XC v7.2.4)

Ubiquiti Networks RM2-Ti (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)

Ubiquiti Networks RM5-Ti (Version: XW v5.6.9/v6.0)



Vendor contact timeline:


2016-11-22: Contacting vendor via HackerOne

2016-11-22: Vendor marks it as duplicate to: #143447

2016-11-23: Asking the vendor for a patch.

2016-11-25: Vendor responds that #143447 should be fixed for next stable


2016-11-25: Asking for an estimated time frame for a fix of the


2016-11-25: Vendor can not give a precise date.

2017-01-10: Asking the vendor for a patch and defined release of the

advisory for 2017-01-16 (concerning the SEC Consult

disclosure policy). Shifted the deadline to 2017-01-30

due to Christmas holidays; No answer.

2017-01-17: Asked for an update.

2017-01-17: Vendor excuses for the delay and responds that they got a

similar report but our PoC does not work.

2017-01-18: Explained PoC again

2017-01-19: Vendor responds that they received a similar report and

assumed a duplication. They state that our PoC never worked

and did not make any sense.

2017-01-20: Uploaded a video which shows a live command injection at an

up-to-date (v6.0) device and posted an assumed reason why

it's possible to exploit

2017-01-21: Vendor responds that they were able to reproduce it now. They

also posted the real cause.

2017-01-24: Asking whether the vulnerability is a duplicate to #143447.

2017-01-24: Vendor responds that it is no duplicate and that this

issue will be fixed as soon as possible.

2017-02-03: Asking for a status update; No answer.

2017-02-21: Asking for a status update; No answer.

2017-03-01: Informing the vendor that the release of the advisory is set to

2017-03-16; No answer.

2017-03-16: Public advisory release

2017-03-21: Vendor provides patched firmware

2017-03-21: Updated advisory





There is no fix available from the vendor.

Update 2017-03-21: According to the vendor, it has been fixed on AirOS v8.0.1,

AirOS v6.0.1, AirGateway v1.1.8, TOUGHSwitch v1.3.4





Restrict user and network access.



Advisory URL:






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EOF T. Weber / @2017