Backdoor account in Korenix Technology JetPort Series


Backdoor account


Korenix JetPort 5601V3

Vulnerable Version

Firmware version 1.0

Fixed Version


CVE Number







T. Weber (Office Vienna) | SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

The device series JetPort from Korenix Technology has a built-in backdoor account. If the corresponding credentials are known to an attacker, he/she can directly access the operating system of the device via the local network (or via NAT). Therefore, an attacker can gain full access.

Vendor description

"Korenix Technology, a Beijer group company within the Industrial Communication business area, is a global leading manufacturer providing innovative, market-oriented, value-focused Industrial Wired and Wireless Networking Solutions.  With decades of experiences in the industry, we have developed various product  lines [...].

Our products are mainly applied in SMART industries: Surveillance, Machine-to-Machine, Automation, Remote Monitoring, and Transportation. Worldwide customer base covers different Sales channels, including end-customers, OEMs, system integrators, and brand label partners. [...]


Business recommendation

The vendor stated that they "will not remove the hardcoded backdoor account as it is needed for customer support and it can't be cracked in a reasonable amount of time."

SEC Consult recommends not to use those devices in production environments and to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further critical security issues. 

Vulnerability overview/description

1) Backdoor Accounts (CVE-2020-12501) 

Multiple different backdoor accounts were found during quick security checks of different firmware files. One backdoor account was tested on a later bought device to verify this specific finding. A telnet service is running on the device by default. This increases the risk of exploitation on the local network. 

Proof of concept

1) Backdoor Accounts (CVE-2020-12501) 

The following account is available on at least one JetPort device of Korenix. There might be more affected devices across this vendor. Westermo and Comtrol devices may be affected too. 

* User "superrd", present on: 
 - JetPort 5601V3 

More devices may be affected. 

Two other users are present on the system according to "/etc/passwd". An additional telnet-daemon is listening on port 19999.

root:<no password> 
superrd:<not cracked> 

By inspecting "/etc/passwd", the only user that is allowed to login to the device is "superrd": 


The listener has been identified by using "ps" and "netcat": 

# ps 
  PID  Uid     VmSize Stat Command 
    1 root       1452 S   init [3] 
  253 root       1780 S   /usr/bin/ser2net -p 600 -c /tmp/com2ip.conf  
  254 root        288 S   /usr/sbin/telnetd -p 19999  
  289 root        788 S   /usr/bin/dropbear  
  297 root       1916 S   /usr/bin/thttpd -C /etc/thttpd.conf -cert /etc/thttpd 

# netstat -tulen 
Active Internet connections (only servers) 
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State      
tcp        0      0 *               LISTEN  

The vulnerability has been manually verified on an emulated device by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime. 

Vulnerable / tested versions

The following product / firmware version has been tested: 

  • Korenix JetPort 5601V3     / 1.0 

Vendor contact timeline

2020-04-14 Contacting CERT@VDE through and requested support for the disclosure process due to the involvement of vendors.
2020-04-15 Security contact responded, that the products were developed by Korenix Technologies.
2020-04-30 Security contact informed us, that some vulnerabilities were confirmed by the vendor.
2020-07-30 Call with Pepperl+Fuchs contact. Contact stated that the vulnerabilities were reported to Korenix.
2020-09-29 Call with Pepperl+Fuchs and CERT@VDE regarding status. Pepperl+Fuchs stated that they just have a sales contact from Korenix.
2020-10-05 Coordinated release of SA-20201005-0.
2020-10-05 Call with the helpdesk of Beijer Electronics AB. The contact stated that no case regarding vulnerabilities were opened and created one. The product owners of Westermo, Korenix and Beijer Electronics were informed via this inquiry. Set disclosure date to 2020-11-25.
2020-10-06 Restarted the whole responsible disclosure process by sending a request to the new security contact
2020-10-07 Received an email from a Korenix representative which offered to answer questions about product security. Started responsible disclosure by requesting email certificate or whether plaintext can be used. Referred to the request to No answer.
2020-11-11 Asked the representatives of Korenix and Beijer regarding the status. No answer.
2020-11-25 Phone call with security manager of Beijer. Sent advisories via encrypted archive to Received confirmation of advisory receipt. Security manager told us that he can provide information regarding the timeline for the patches within the next two weeks.
2020-12-09 Asked for an update.
2020-12-18 Call with security manager of Beijer. Vendor presented initial analysis done by the affected companies.
2021-03-21 Security manager invited SEC Consult to have a status meeting.
2021-03-26 Agreed on an advisory split as other affected products will get patched later.
2021-04-12 Performed advisory split.
2021-05-26 Meeting regarding advisory publication. Agreed to release this advisory in Q4.
2021-06-01 Released related advisory SA-20210601-0.

Upon contacting Beijer Electronics on 2021-06-24, our Beijer Electronics contact informs us that he leaves the company today. Refers us to new contact in CC.

2021-07-05 Follow-up meeting with new vendor contact regarding next steps.
2021-07-16 Contact from Beijer Electronics reached out to Korenix. Engineers from Korenix are still investigating the issues. JetWave 2311 went EoL, next status update in August 2021. JetPort will be fixed in Q1 2022.
2021-09-15 Asked for status update;
2021-09-20 Korenix will provide a time schedule for the patches by end of next week.
2021-09-28 Meeting regarding the schedule. Fixes will be available by end of the year for Korenix JetWave series.
2021-09-28 Update call with vendor; Fixes will be available in November.
2021-11-18 Contact had difficulties to get a response from Korenix. JetWave 2212G 1.8.0 has been released, other fixes will be released in December.
2021-11-22 Vendor provides all other fixed versions, which have already been put online.
2021-12-17 Performed another advisory split.
2021-12-20 Update call with vendor. Identified another possibly affected device (JetWave 3420). Investigation will be started from Korenix as soon as possible.
2021-12-28 Vendor has rolled out an update for the JetWave 3420 V3 firmware.
2022-01-17 Informed vendor about the advisory release within the next two weeks.
2022-01-19 Call with vendor; agreed that advisory can be published for JetWave series.
2022-01-24 Informed vendor about advisory release on 2022-01-31.
2022-01-31 Released related advisory SA-20220131-0.
2022-02-22 Vendor says, that fixes are estimated to be completed by end of February.
2022-03-29 Most issues from the related advisories (SA-20201005-0, SA-20210601-0) are not applicable according to the vendor, only the backdoor account exists in the JetPort series. The JetPort series will not go end of life. The backdoor is needed in order to assist customers with problems and Korenix claims the password can't be cracked in a reasonable amount of time, hence it will not be fixed. Security contact states that there is no point in waiting and we can release the security advisory.
2022-04-05 Another call to clarify with security contact; Korenix will not remove the account as this issue is not considered as critical.
2022-05-18 Tried to re-send the advisory for final review which only contains the backdoor account information. Received auto-reply that our contact from Beijer Group (who did the coordination with Korenix) was no longer part of the company.
2022-05-31 Public release of security advisory.


None available. The vendor stated that they "will not remove the hardcoded backdoor account as it is needed for customer support and it can't be cracked in a reasonable amount of time."



Advisory URL

EOF Thomas Weber / @2022 

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