Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in Statamic CMS


Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities


Statamic CMS

Vulnerable Version

<4.46.0, <3.4.17

Fixed Version

>=4.46.0, >=3.4.17

CVE Number







Niklas Schilling (Office Munich) | SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

Multiple stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were identified in the Content Management System (CMS) Statamic. This enables attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the victim's browser in the context of the attacked website. If an admin of the application falls victim to this vulnerability, accounts can be taken over.

Vendor description

"Statamic is a modern, clean, and highly adaptable CMS built on Laravel that can run full-stack, headless, on flat files or databases, or as a static site generator."


Business recommendation

The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. Furthermore, an updated guideline for implementing a Content Security Policy (CSP) is provided by the vendor.

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues.

Vulnerability overview/description

1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Forms feature (CVE-2024-24570)

Statamic's Forms feature allows unauthenticated users to upload certain filetypes. While only a limited number of file extensions are allowed, it's possible to bypass these restrictions to upload an HTML file containing JavaScript code.

2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Link Field

Statamic's Link Field feature provides authenticated users a convenient way of inserting Hyperlinks into a collection's entry. It was identified that it's possible to execute JavaScript code upon clicking on a specially crafted Hyperlink.

Proof of concept

1) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Forms feature (CVE-2024-24570)

When trying to upload an HTML file as an unauthenticated user, the .html extension gets correctly detected by Statamic, leading to the file being blocked from uploading.

This check can be bypassed though, by instead using a .jpg file extension, as files of this type are allowed to be uploaded. Afterwards, the file's content is analyzed by Statamic and correctly interpreted as HTML, resulting in the initial .jpg extension being replaced with an .html extension. As no checks on this newly set file extension are performed, the file is now shown as a valid submission in Statamic's "Forms" page.

If an authenticated user accesses this submission, the included JavaScript code will be executed. This can be verified by uploading a file called "test.jpg" with the following content:

<!DOCTYPE html>
        <script>alert("Stored XSS on "+window.origin)</script>

To further demonstrate the criticality of this vulnerability, the following JavaScript code can be used:

[ POC code removed from public advisory ]

When an admin user now accesses this JavaScript submission, the following happens:
1. Load the "Users" page in a hidden iframe and extract the CSRF token from it.
2. Request user information and extract the user ID and email address from
   the response.
3. Request a password reset code for the extracted used ID.
4. Extract the password reset code from the response and send it to the
   attacker server including the user's email address.

After receiving the victim's password reset code and email address, the attacker can now visit the following URL and set a new password:

https:// <STATAMIC_SERVER>/!/auth/password/reset/<PASSWORD_RESET_CODE>

This results in a successful takeover of the victim's account.

2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Link Field

When using a Link Field of type "URL", the following XSS payload can be used as input:


As this input is typically placed in the "href" attribute of an anchor tag, the JavaScript pseudo protocol can be used to execute arbitrary JavaScript code upon clicking on the Hyperlink. In this case the external file "poc.js" will be loaded, which contains the JavaScript code from the password reset code stealer above (removed from public advisory).

This way, an authenticated user with lower privileges can gain control over an admin's account after the admin clicks on the malicious Hyperlink.

Statamic's "sanitize" modifier doesn't prevent this attack, as no illegal characters are being used in the XSS payload:

<a href="{{ url_link | sanitize }}">Link</a>

Vulnerable / tested versions

The following version has been tested which was the latest version available at the time of the test

  • 4.45.0

The following Statamic CMS versions are affected by this vulnerability:

  • <4.46.0
  • <3.4.17

Vendor contact timeline

2024-01-24 Contacting vendor through
2024-01-24 Vendor confirms receipt of advisory and states that they aim to resolve the issues within the next few days.
2024-01-26 Vendor fixes the first stored XSS and shares the corresponding GitHub security advisory draft. Furthermore, valid arguments for mitigating the second stored XSS via a correctly set CSP are supplied. Vendor also creates a new documentation page for setting the CSP in the correct areas.
2024-01-26 Confirming that setting a correctly configured CSP for the necessary areas results in a higher efficiency in mitigating the second security issue.
2024-01-29 Suggesting an adjustment of the assigned CVSS3.1 score that was set in the vendor's GitHub security advisory. Also asking for planned public disclosure and the assignment of a CVE number.
2024-01-29 Vendor adjusts CVSS3.1 score and suggests requesting a CVE number via GitHub.
2024-01-30 Received CVE number CVE-2024-24570.
2024-02-12 Coordinated release of advisory.


The vendor provided a patch for the "Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Forms" feature (CVE-2024-24570):

  • Update version "4.X" to "4.46.0" or later
  • Update version "3.X" to "3.4.17" or later

Get the newest release of Statamic CMS here:

The vendor will not provide a patch regarding "Stored Cross-Site Scripting in Link Field" but suggests to implement a correctly configured CSP as described in Statamic's newly added documentation page:

Vendor advisory:


No workaround available.

Advisory URL

EOF Niklas Schilling / @2024


Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices